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THE ETHICAL INVESTOR: By John G. Simon,' Charles W. Powers,2 and Jon
P. Gunnemann. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1972. 208 pp.
By Howard 0. Hunter'
The Ethical Investor is the result of a typical university approach to a
problem: an issue concerning the morality of the investment policy of uni-
versities was raised; the matter was discussed for a couple of years in com-
mittee meetings; it became the subject of a seminar; and the professors who
led the seminar spent another year writing their conclusions. The conclusion?
There are no easy answers and no easy solutions, which is a typical academic
response to any question involving moral and ethical issues. This reviewer's
skepticism about the possibility of significant changes in university in-
vestment policy should not detract from the efforts of Messrs. Simon,
Powers, and Gunnemann, who have done an excellent job of clarifying the
multitude of issues which surround the very sensitive question of a
university's investment policies.5 But the authors go beyond a mere compila-
tion of issues and suggest a possible approach to a "moral" investment
policy. Prior to considering their suggested approach, it will be helpful to
examine the context in which this study took place, and also to consider
some of the very practical questions which it raises.
The demand that a university cleanse its portfolio of stocks in "bad"
companies (e.g., companies that produce war materials or which have large
investments in apartheid South Africa) presents most private universities
with a serious practical dilemma wholly separate from the problem of deter-
mining which companies are "unclean." This dilemma revolves around the
university's quest for economic survival; if American universities consider
moral factors to the exclusion of profit, their very existence may be threat-
ened. Inflationary pressures of the past several years have put many private
colleges and universities in a precarious financial condition, and it is under-
standable that trustees would be reluctant to approach investment policy
from a moral rather than a purely profit-making viewpoint.
The authors' analysis has resulted in conclusions that may be briefly
summarized as follows: (1) corporations, as such, have a responsibility not
to engage in conduct which is socially injurious; (2) individual shareholders
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'The authors are primarily concerned with the university as a corporate investor, and not
as a landlord, land developer, tenant, taxpayer, or government contractor. Presumably, the
same moral questions could also be raised with respect to such other university activities.
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the corporation from acting in a socially injurious manner; and (3) universi-
ties as institutional shareholders share the same moral responsibilities as
individual shareholders although there are factors which constrain university
action that are not applicable to individual shareholders. The authors sug-
gest that universities should be guided by what they call the "basic policy:"
The "moral minimum" responsibility of the shareholder to take
such action as he can to prevent or correct corporate social injury
extends to the university when it is a corporate shareholder.
The authors correctly distinguish small sectarian colleges from more di-
verse liberal arts colleges and universities. The former usually exist for a
specific purpose, such as preparing and training ministers for a certain reli-
gious sect, and their financial policies may be more directly tied to these
limited educational goals. The "basic policy" is intended to apply primarily
to institutions which have a broader educational and cultural purpose. A
further distinction is made between private and public universities. The pri-
vate institution has certain direct responsibilities to its students, faculty, and
alumni, and more general responsibilities to the entire community. Public
universities are largely dependent on public funding, and, therefore, have a
greater and more direct responsibility to the supporting taxpayers. But this
should not suggest that the authors believe that the "basic policy"is inapplic-
able to public universities and the small, sectarian institution; rather, they
simply realize that such schools have certain additional restrictions on their
activities that a private, liberal arts university does not have.
The authors recognize that the trustees of any university are limited in the
actions they may take by their legal, fiduciary duty to the institution. This
is in contrast to the individual shareholder whose only fiduciary duty is to
himself. Largely because of the trustees' fiduciary duty, the authors reject
an activist approach to investment policy-making that may be economically
risky. They also specifically refrain from suggesting that universities replace
profit-making as their primary investment goal.
Not surprisingly, the authors generally reject divestment as an adjunct to
a "moral minimum" investment policy. Even if the trustees were in agree-
ment on which companies were "unclean" from a moral standpoint, the
institution most likely to suffer from a wholesale divestment approach would
not be the offending corporation, but the university itself, which might be
forced to sell its holdings at a depressed price or at a time unfavorable for
its overall economic policies. Correspondingly, the sale of such large blocks
of stock in publicly held companies may have little effect on the company
unless such sales coincide with other economically depressing factors. The
authors cite as an example the sale by Dupont pursuant to an antitrust
JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW
BOOK REVIEWS
decree of its prodigious holdings in General Motors. Divestment might be a
logical course when a corporation is clearly flouting the law or some well-
established social policy and the corporation fails to respond to letters and
suggestions from its shareholders. The authors conclude that even in such
an instance divestment should not occur if it would cause economic harm
to the university. The clearer case for the consideration of the authors'
"basic policy" is when the university is not yet a shareholder but is consider-
ing investment among companies with relatively equal investment opportun-
ities. If one is engaged in activities which are, or could be, socially injurious
from a moral standpoint, then arguments in favor of investing in others
would be persuasive. It would appear from the author's standpoint that
morality as an investment consideration is only a factor where economic
considerations are basically equal. To effectuate, the "basic policy," the
authors have established rather lengthy guidelines for the university to fol-
low. These guidelines take into account most of the possible contingencies
and clearly contemplate that the primary aim of any university investment
policy is to make money. Moral concerns are important, so the authors keep
stating; however, there are limitations on the ability of any university to
manifest moral and ethical concerns in any investment policy.
It is difficult to argue with the premise of the authors' "basic policy." To
do so would almost be tantamount to saying that in matters of money
neither individuals nor institutions should have any social responsibility. The
cover illustration from the Bible Moralise6 showing a group of merchants
depositing their moneybags with the banker of hell is illustrative of this
extreme. But one who attempts to be strictly moralistic in formulating in-
vestment policy may find little that is really pure, and while such a purist
policy may find university trustees negotiating with St. Peter, it may be that
there will be little to deposit with his banker. In their guidelines, the authors
do recognize some of the practical problems of investment management;
they indicate that one cannot expect university trustees to be purists. The
authors' proposals are therefore couched in the language of a "moral mini-
mum," which is to say that universities should try to influence corporations
in which they own stock towards moral and social responsibility, but only if
by so doing the universities do not bite too hard the hands that feed them.
This low key approach to investment policy which the authors suggest is
generally appealing, but there are difficulties in implementing such a policy.
So long as the trustees are guided solely by the profit motive, there may be
serious disagreements about investment decisions but at least there is a
common denominator. When social and moral issues enter into investment
policy decisions, there is always going to be a wide range of disagreement.
The authors seem to think that universities have a special competence to
make decisions on moral and ethical issues and to put these decisions into
effect as corporate shareholders. This premise is questionable.
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The authors argue for the establishment at each college or university of a
special council on investments. This council would be made up of representa-
tives from all factions of the university-students, alumni, faculty, and ad-
ministration. The council would have the general authority to review the
university's portfolio and to investigate the companies in which the univer-
sity owns stock, all of which could get quite complicated if the university
owned shares in a large number of mutual funds. The council would also
hear complaints from members of the university community. From time to
time the council would make recommendations to the trustees about upcom-
ing shareholders' votes, about the policies of particular companies, and
about actions being taken by other shareholders. The ultimate decision on
any matter would be left up to the trustees. The council would be nothing
more than an advisory panel with no real power of its own other than the
power of persuasion. By choosing to structure the council in this manner the
authors seem to concede that moral considerations will be purely secondary
to the primary consideration of pecuniary gain. Moreover, there is a serious
problem in deciding who will serve on the council, and one can readily
foresee difficulties over quotas and proportional representation. Additional
problems will result in arriving at recommendations. If the council is a truly
representative body, there will be as many differing opinions as members,
and even decisions by a bare majority will require considerable time, study,
and discussion.
In sum, the authors have raised most of the major issues involved in any
decision to base investment management at least in part on something other
than the profit motive. Their basic premise, that universities should be so-
cially responsible investors, is difficult to attack, because it puts the attacker
in the position of appearing to say that universities should be socially irre-
sponsible investors. However, the real question is whether a university has
the time, energy, or resources to devote to the process of decision-making
which the authors suggest. Should the limited resources of a university be
used to direct investment policy as the authors propose, or should these same
resources and energies be channeled into projects which might have more
important long range social consequences? Perhaps one solution would be
for a university to adhere rigorously to a policy of detached neutrality and
to abstain from all shareholder votes. Thereby, the university would leave
the ethical considerations to other shareholders, but at least not use its
holdings as a blind endorsement of management decisions. On the other
hand, there may be some companies which clearly act in a socially irrespon-
sible manner, and in such an extreme case the university may find it much
easier to adopt an ethically-based decision. For many institutions, the real
question is one of allocation of resources. With all due respect for the
difficult questions posed by The Ethical Investor, institutions which find
themselves struggling for economic survival may well find comfort only with
a strictly profit-oriented approach to investment.
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